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This article aims to test the relevance of learning through Genetic Algorithms, in opposition with
ﬁxed R&D rules, in a simpliﬁed version of the evolutionary industry model of Nelson and Winter.
These two R&D strategies are compared from the points of view of industry performance (welfare)
and ﬁrms’ relative performance (competitive edge): the results of simulations clearly show that
learning is a source of technological and social efﬁciency as well as a mean for market domination.
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Research and development(R&D)decisionsarecharacterized bya stronguncertaintyconcerning the
return on investment. This uncertainty is stronger for R&D investment than for other types of invest-
ment. Indeed innovations often result from what Simon [1958] calls “nonprogrammed decisions”,
that is situations where the alternatives of choices must be discovered by ﬁrms and the connections
between choices and consequences are imperfectly known. It is the reason why R&D decisions are
generally associated with the uncertainty in the sense of Knight [1921]. This uncertainty strongly
limits the ability of ﬁrms to form expectations about the return on their R&D investment. In this
context, ﬁrms must be able to improve, through experience, their perception of the relationships
between R&D investment and competitiveness and to adapt accordingly their R&D decisions (see
Oltra & Yildizoglu [1998]). Modelling R&D decisions must consequently rely on decision rules
more sophisticated than the ﬁxed rules that have been traditionally adopted in models of technology
dynamics under bounded rationality assumption (see, for example, the models in Nelson & Winter
[1982]).
As a matter of fact, ﬁxed rules are not a necessary characteristic of decisions under bounded
rationality: the main characteristic is procedural rationality (Simon [1976]). Hence, bounded ra-
tionality does not preclude the tendency of agents to adjust their decisions to the evolution of their
(technological and competitive) environment. Even if they do not search for the globally best solu-
tions, agents learn from their experience and this learning allows them to ﬁne-tune their decisions.
Consequently, one must search for a better way of modelling decisions in order to take into account
this individual learning.
Of course, one could choose to implement a simple process of trial and error but such a process
wouldcontain astrongad hocelement intheway itmodelsthesequenceoftrials. Firmsdo deﬁnitely
not proceed by purely random trials. When learning is individual1, new strategies are necessarily
based on the past experience: ﬁrms combine known decision rules in order to reach better ones. Ge-
netic Algorithms (GA), implement such a learning process through evolutionary mechanisms: from
a population of actual decision rules, the selection keeps the best ones, the crossover combines these
in order to obtainbetterrules and themutationintroducessomesmallamountof random experiment-
ing. Moreover, they have the capacity to robustly handle quite complex environments (see Goldberg
[1991] for several examples) and, in this sense, can well correspond to the conditions of R&D deci-
sions. One should not conceive GA as a way to represent the exact decision mechanism of ﬁrms but
as a way to represent the presence of learning and of experience-oriented search processes. The GAs
also have the capacity to provide a uniﬁed modeling strategy in the vast diversity of mechanisms
adopted in models of bounded rationality (one could nearly establish a one-to-one correspondence
in the literature between models and modelling strategies). Since they take into account learning,
they constitute a good rival of ﬁxed rules that seem to actually constitute the only unifying approach.
This article aims to test the relevance of GA, in opposition with ﬁxed R&D rules, in a simpliﬁed
version of the evolutionary industry model of Nelson and Winter. The original model is simpliﬁed
in order to focus on R&D process as the main determinant of industry dynamics. Firms arbitrate
at each period between R&D and physical capital when allocating their gross proﬁts to different
investment projects. The industry is composed of two types of ﬁrms: the NWFirms that use a ﬁxed
decision rule and GenFirms that adjust their R&D investmentthrough a GA. Competition selects, in
the long term, the ﬁrms that outperforms their competitors: ﬁrms can only ﬁnance their investments
by the proﬁts and they must leave the industry when their physical capital vanishes.
1Silverberg&Verspagen[1996]aswellasKwasnicki&Kwasnicka[1992]formalizelearningaslocalindividualran-
dom experiments combined with industry wide imitation. This learning process has both an individual and a population
level components. Our objective is to model learning as a fully individual process.
1The relevance of explicit inclusion of learning through GA is tested at two levels. First, at the
industry level, these modelling strategies are confronted comparing the performances of four cases
composed from 0% to 100% of GenFirms. The results of simulations show that the presence of
learning ﬁrms leads to higher technological performance as well as to higher welfare. In the second
place, fromthepointofviewofindividualﬁrms, thepropertiesofheterogenousindustriesarestudied
in order to assess the competitive role of learning. In fact, learning allows for the discovery of better
R&D strategies but it is also costly: ﬁrms must test new strategies that quite often happen to be worst
thantheactualones. Onlythecomparisonofperformances ofbothtypesofﬁrms inthelongtermcan
establish the utility of learning strategies. Our results show that GenFirms dominate systematically
the industry and this domination ﬂows from their learning. These results are obtained through the
simulation methodology already developed in Jonard & Yildizoglu [1998]. This procedure uses the
comparison, with non-parametric statistical methods, of the results of batches of simulations instead
of the comparison of individual simulations.
Java and Win32 binary versionsof this program can be found on theweb2. This sitealso contains
full documentation in Sun’s API format.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In section two we present the character-
istics of the model. The connection between the genetic algorithm and the learning process also
is discussed it this section. Section three is dedicated to the presentation of our methodology and
results. Section four concludes.
2 The model
I only emphasize new elements in the model. The intersection with the well known Nelson & Winter
[1982] (part V, ch.12) model will ﬁrst be outlined. A second section will present new dimensions
included in this model: capital and R&D investments.
2.1 Characteristics common with Nelson and Winter(1982)
At the beginning of each period, the ﬁrm j is characterized by the productivity Aj of it’s technology
and it’s capital stock, Kj. Capital is the only production factor, and the production technology is
characterized by ﬁxed input coefﬁcient and constant scale economies. Unit using cost of capital, c;
is constant over different production techniques (the unit cost of production is c=Aj). The capital
stock depreciates at a rate d at each period.
Production technics are disembodied. There is no switching cost and the capital can be converted
without cost from one technology to another (for a more realistic model with vintage capital, see
Silverberg, Dosi & Orsenigo [1988]). This corresponds to a vision of technology based on process
innovation. In fact, the innovating ﬁrm does not replace its capital stock, but uses it more efﬁciently.
An innovation therefore corresponds to better knowledge of the production process.
2.1.1 Production and proﬁts
Each ﬁrm in the industry (j 2 I = f1:::Ng) produces the same homogenous good with the following
production function:
Qj = Aj Kj: (1)
2http://cournot.u-strasbg.fr/yildi/learnind/index.html.
2The gross proﬁt rate on capital of the ﬁrm is given by:
pj = pA−c (2)











where Q is the total supply, p(Q) is a constant elasticity inverse market demand function, and h
is the Marshalian demand elasticity. Gross proﬁts of the ﬁrm are given by
Pj = pj Kj (4)
The state of each ﬁrm will change from one period to another in consequence of the R&D deci-
sions, which modify its technology and hence its productivity, and the investment behavior, which
modiﬁes its capital stock.
2.1.2 R&D and technical progress
The productivitiesare modiﬁed in each period consequently to the technical progress. In each period
ﬁrms invest RDjt on R&D. This investment allows them to imitate their successful competitors and
to innovate. Both imitation and innovation are two-stage stochastic processes.
Innovation
Innovation is a two-stage stochastic process. A ﬁrst draw determines if the R&D investment of
the ﬁrm has been successful and resulted in an innovation:
P[dint = 1]=anRDjt;
where an is a calibration parameter that projects RD on [0;1]. A second draw gives the effective







Hence innovationis a cumulativeprocess and ﬁrms with higher productivitieshave better chance
to attain even higher productivities.
Imitation
For the imitation, we have one stochastic draw which determines if the ﬁrm’s R&D investment
has been successful. If it is the case, the ﬁrm obtains the best practice in the industry (A
t ):
P[dimt = 1]=amRDjt






New productivity of the ﬁrm
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(5)
32.2 Capital investment and R&D decisions
Main differences between this model and Nelson & Winter (1982) consist in the investment be-
haviour: investment in physical capital and investment in R&D. A possibility of exit from the indus-
try is also included in the model. In each period ﬁrms invest a fraction of their gross proﬁt on R&D.
The rest of this proﬁt is used for the expansion of physical capital.
2.2.1 R&D decisions and genetic algorithms
Firms invest a fraction rdjt of their gross proﬁts on R&D. A minimal investment is necessary to keep
alive the R&D potential (research equipment and team). We therefore have rdjt  rdmin:
There are two types of ﬁrms: NWFirms and GenFirms. They are distinguished by their R&D
investment behaviour.
NWFirms invest in each period a ﬁxed proportion rdNW of their proﬁt in R&D (in addition to the
minimal amount of R&D):
RDNW jt =( rdmin+rdNW)Pjt (6)
This rule corresponds to the representation of bounded rationality by “ﬁxed rules”. Learning of
ﬁrms about theirenvironmentdoes notinﬂuence theirR&D behaviour. Thisis thecommonapproach
retained in many evolutionary industry models. Learning is taken into account in the behaviour of
GenFirms.
Each GenFirm uses an individual genetic algorithm (GA) in order to adjust the R&D strategy (the
fraction rdjt  rdmin) to the conditions of the industry. Each possible strategy of the ﬁrm is coded as
a chromosomeCi of length G: During its life, the ﬁrm carries a population of C strategies (number
of chromosomes). This population of parallel rules evolves as a consequence of the experience of
the ﬁrm in the industry.
The experience of the ﬁrm can only inﬂuence these rules if it provides an evaluation mechanism
for different rules. In an industrial context, the only way of evaluatinga rule is using it: the valueof a
rule depends on the dynamics of the industry and hence, on the behaviour of other ﬁrms. Moreover,
R&D investment does not pay back immediately and each R&D strategy must be used for many
periods before proving its efﬁciency. Consequently, in order to evaluate each rule, the ﬁrm uses
it for a number of periods (n =learning period)a n dthe average gross proﬁt rate of this time
interval gives the ﬁtness of this strategy. When all strategies of the population are evaluated, a new
population is generated through selection–crossover–mutation. We use an elitist GA that conserves
the best strategy of the preceding period in the population.
We adopt an indirect coding of R&D strategies: the fraction of proﬁts dedicated to R&D (strat-
egy) is coded as a chromosomeCi of length G. The decimal value of the chromosome corresponds
to the position of this strategy in the search space [0%;100%]: This space contains D = å
i=G−1
i=0 12i
equally spaced strictly positive strategies, and zero. The R&D rate corresponding to a chromosome





Example: If G =4, there are (1111)10 =123+122+121+120 =15=D strictly positivestrate-
gies equally spaced between 0% and 100%. If a strategy of the ﬁrm is Ci = 0011; this chromosome
4corresponds to the following R&D investment rate:










Even if the GA does not represent the exact learning mechanism of ﬁrms, it is a convenient way
ofrepresentingthepresence ofthislearningat theindividuallevel. Ourrepresentationofthelearning
process is signiﬁcantly different from the one considered by Brenner [1998] in his comparison of
evolutionary algorithms with learning algorithms. Many limits to which Brenner [1998] draws our
attention concerns the use of the evolutionary algorithms at the population level. Quite differently,
we use the GA to represent learning of rules at the individual level: each ﬁrm carries an individual
population evolving of decision rules. Our formulation gives a clear microeconomic foundation to
learning in accordance with the modelling of the industry dynamics. The importance of this point is
clearly established by Vriend [1998]. This formulation also excludes many ambiguities that appear
when one models learning of rules at the industry level: the deﬁnition of ﬁtness at the industry level,
the connection between selection and performance of individual ﬁrms are the most disturbing of
them.
Consequently, the selection–crossover–mutation mechanisms respectively correspond, at the
ﬁrm level, to the elimination of bad rules, to the combination of the selcted rules in order to dis-
cover better new rules, and to few random experiments. Elitism assures that memory is taken into
account and good old rules are not eliminated if better new rules are not found. Also, the chromo-
some length, G; has a signiﬁcation in terms of the learning process of ﬁrms: the higher G; the ﬁner
thesearch processoftheﬁrm. A ﬁrmthat usesahigherG ismoredemandingforitslearningprocess:
it desires to get closer to the best strategies in the search space. But learning will be costlier for such
a ﬁrm because it will have to try many rules before getting closer to the best ones. Consequently,
the boundaries of the search space do not depend on G (ﬁrms always explore [0%;100%])b u tt h e
reﬁnement of the process does. Our coding mechanism hence combines the best of two worlds:
the speed of binary coding and the ﬂexibility of graycode. A higher number of chromosomes (C)
corresponds to a more ﬂexible learning process that will conserve more rules in the rule population
of the ﬁrm, but this ﬂexibility will also have a cost: the higher the number of rules in the population,
the higher the total learning period for each particular population of rules. Consequently, a nice
correspondence exists between the characteristics of the GA and the learning processes of ﬁrms.
2.2.2 Investment in physical capital
Capital investment results directly from the arbitrage of ﬁrms between the R&D investment and
capital expansion. Learning ﬁrms adapt the sharing of gross proﬁts between R&D and physical
capital:






If the proﬁts of the ﬁrm get persistently low, it can loose all possibility of investment and innovation.
In this case, current proﬁts do not permit any investments. The capital stock of the ﬁrm vanishes
because of the depreciation. When the capital stock gets very small, the ﬁrm looses all possibility of
innovation and growth. It consequently exits the industry when
Kjt  K:
3 Simulation methodology and results
I use the simulation protocol developed in Jonard & Yildizoglu [1998]. This protocol is explained
in a ﬁrst paragraph. Relative performance of GenFirms is measured through different indicators that
have been developed for this article. Simulation results are used to assess the role of learning at two
different levels. First, the role of learning on the aggregate performance of the industry is explored.
Second, the relative performance of learning ﬁrms – i.e. their competitive edge – is evaluated.
3.1 Protocol
Since we aim to derive results independent from a particular sequence of random numbers, a batch
of 20 simulations, of 6000 periods each, is run for each conﬁguration of the model. Observations
have been saved every 40 periods. The whole possible history of the industry is hence represented
by a sample of 3000 observations. The relevant dimensions (e.g. technical progress, concentration)
of resulting samples are compared by way of non-parametric testing (the non-parametric Wilcoxon–
Mann–Whitney test, see for instance ch.18 in Watson, Billingsley, Croft & Huntsberger [1993]). For
convenience, results are presented as box plots where the box gives the central 50% of the sample
centered around the median: the box hence gives the ﬁrst, second and third quartiles (Q1;Q2;Q3)
of the distribution. The whiskers give the signiﬁcant minimum and the signiﬁcant maximum of
the distribution. Each box contains the whole history of the industry for all simulations for each
corresponding conﬁguration.
This protocol allows the qualitative comparison of different industry conﬁgurations. Different
indicators are used for these comparisons.
3.2 Indicators
Quite standard indicators are used for the comparison of performance of industries:
 welfare indicators: market price, average gross proﬁts and concentration of capital;
 technical efﬁciency indicators: average productivity and maximal productivity.











6where Kj is the capital stock of ﬁrm j. This indicator gives an equivalent number of ﬁrms as if
each of them had the same part of capital stock. We have 1  K  N where N is the number of
active ﬁrms in the industry. The higher is this indicator, the more evenly balanced is the distribution
of capital stock between ﬁrms. This is an application of the Herﬁndall index to the capital stocks
and summarizes the inequalities in the distribution of the capital stock.
SomesimplenewindicatorsarenecessaryinordertocomparerelativeperformanceofGenFirms:
 the share of capital owned by GenFirms;
 the share of GenFirms in cumulated proﬁts;
 market share of GenFirms;
 R&D investment share of GenFirms.
Since the shares of NWFirms are complementary and give a total of 100%, only the shares of
GenFirms are used for comparison.
3.3 Comparison of industry performance
Three different points of view can be adopted for the evaluation of the impact of learning on indus-
trial efﬁciency: technological performance, ﬁrms’ proﬁt and consumers’ welfare. We do not have
a direct indicator for consumers’ welfare, but the market price is of course inversely related to con-
sumers’ surplus. The effect on ﬁrms’ surplus can be appreciated by comparing the distribution of
average cumulative proﬁts in each industry conﬁguration. Technological performance is evaluated
through average and maximal productivity. The latter shows how far a particular industry can go in
the technology space and the former resumes general technological level of industry.
The presence of learning ﬁrms should normally increase technological efﬁciency because these
ﬁrms are able to exploit the increasing relationship that exists between R&D investment and innova-
tion. But there is a speciﬁc cost for learning: in order to learn, ﬁrms must spend time to try different
strategies, including the inferior ones. Learning can consequently be a source of delay in the discov-
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Figure 1: Learning and technology dynamics
We compare four industry conﬁgurations:
7nwgen0: 100% of NWFirms;
nwgen1: 75% of NWFirms, 25% of GenFirms;
nwgen2: 50% of each type;
nwgen3: 75% of GenFirms;
nwgen4: 100% of GenFirms.
All conﬁgurations have a total population of 40 ﬁrms and all GenFirms are the simplest kind,
they haveC = 8 chromosomes of G = 7 genes. NWFirms invest (rdmin+7%) in R&D. rdmin = 3%:


































nwgen0 nwgen1 nwgen2 nwgen3 nwgen4
Figure 2: Learning and market structure
The results on technological efﬁciency are represented in Figure 1. Graphic (a) clearly shows
that learning ﬁrms contribute very signiﬁcantly to the technological advancement of the industry.
Their impact is important even if they form a minority (even 25%). Moreover, the difference with
the distribution of average productivity (Graphic (b)) is very small and consequently the diffusion
is very quick in these industries. Higher technological efﬁciency is due to the presence of learning.
This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Presence of learning ﬁrms is a sourceof technologicalefﬁciency at the industrylevel.
One could, wrongly, be tempted to explain this positive effect by the low rd ratio of NWFirms,
but we have very similar distributions even when rdNW = 27% (see Figure 4).
Quite interestingly, this efﬁciency is even costless for society. The presence of learning ﬁrms
increases the concentration of capital (equivalent number of ﬁrms decreases in Figure 2–(b)) but
this higher concentration does not increase the market price (Figure 2–(c)). Hence the effect on
consumers’ welfare is not negative (Figure 2–(c)). Moreover, higher investments in R&D do not
even penalize thegross proﬁts of theﬁrms (Figure 2–(a)): learning is even a source of supplementary
proﬁts for the industry and the global effect of learning on society is clearly positive.
8Proposition 2 Presence of learning ﬁrms implies
1. higher concentration;
2. higher gross proﬁts;
3. lower market price;
4. higher social welfare.
These consequences clearly result from the evolutionof the arbitrageof GenFirms between R&D
investment and capital investment. This proposition also implies that if we neglect learning, we can
overestimate the welfare loss generally associated to greater concentration: even nwgen1 (25% of
learning ﬁrms)clearly improvesthesocial welfarein comparisonwithnwgen0 (100% ofNWFirms).
Learning ﬁrms deliberately modify both components of their production: cost and capital stock. The
presence of learning ﬁrms is hence a source of dynamic social efﬁciency at the industry level and the
efﬁciency at the technological level is the real source of this positive effect on social welfare.

































Figure 3: Relative performance of GenFirms
3.4 Competing R&D strategies
Relativeperformance of GenFirms can be measured by theirshare in aggregatemagnitudes ofthe in-
dustry. It is indeed importantto show that learning ﬁrms are effectively beneﬁting from this learning.
We use hybrid industries (nwgen1, nwgen2 and nwgen3) for this comparison.
The Figure 3 clearly shows that when GenFirms compose more than 50% of the initial popula-
tion, they dominate the whole history of the industry (Figures 3–(a)-(c)). This domination comes
from a higher investment on R&D than the NWFirms (Figure 3–(d)).
Proposition 3 When they do not form a too small minority, learning ﬁrms dominate the market and
gain shares comparatively to their initial positions.
9R&D share of GenFirms
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nwh0 nwh1 nwh2 nwh3
Figure 4: rdNW = 27%+3%
The costly and random nature of learning plays against learning ﬁrms when they are too few in
the industry and their mistakes eventually push them out of the industry. When they are numerous,
some of them succeed and they end up dominating the industry. One could think that the low R&D
rate of NWFirms is responsible of this result. The following ﬁgure shows that even with higher ﬁxed
R&D rate, NWFirms cannot dominate the industry.
Proposition 4 Even if the R&D rate of NWFirms is high, GenFirms dominate the R&D activity of
the industry.
The Figures 4–(a) and (c) show that even when facing NWFirms with higher R&D rate, Gen-
Firms dominate the industry. In fact, higher R&D rate imposes a stringent constraint on capital in-
vestment of NWﬁrms while GenFirms are continuously arbitrating between these two investments.
Their relative performance is even higher in this case. Figures 4–(b) and (d) again indicate the
positive impact of learning ﬁrms on the performances of industry.
In order to check the reality of learning, we need to abandon our methodology and consider an
individual simulation (the last of the 20 simulations). The Figure 5 gives central indicators of the
distribution of R&D rate of the GenFirms in nwgen2. We represent in this ﬁgure (µ−s;µ;µ+s)
where µ is the average and s is the standard deviation. This Figure clearly shows that GenFirms are
not simply randomizing and the dispersion is decreasing in time.
Proposition 5 GenFirms learn.
4 Conclusion
This article is a ﬁrst attempt to explicitly compare different behaviour rules for R&D investment.








Figure 5: Convergence of rdjt in nwgen4
model (MOSES model of Swedish industry) considerably conceals the exact role of different deci-
sion rules in industry and ﬁrms performance. I deliberately adopt a very simple model in order to
completely focus on the effects of R&D rules.
Two general results dominate the simulations. In the ﬁrst place, results at the industry level
clearly show that we should not ignore learning in models of industry. Otherwise, this can result in a
severe underestimation of the performance of industries at the technological level and, at the level of
social welfare: industries with learning ﬁrms exhibit higher technological and social efﬁciency. The
imperfect competition generally associated to the innovation process is not necessarily the cause of
a signiﬁcant loss of welfare, even in the short term. In the second place, learning gives a competitive
edge to ﬁrms beneﬁtting from it: learning ﬁrms dominate the industry. Both results are directly
engendered by the continuous arbitrage of learning ﬁrms between R&D and capital investments.
On a methodological level, one of the shortcomings of Genetic Algorithms in industrial context
with endogenous payoff structure is the necessity of effectively using each rule in order to discover
its ﬁtness. Learning is consequently slow (a different but similar problem also applies to classiﬁer
systems): ﬁrm’s learning is directly on the strategy space. A more ambitious assumption about
learning would consider ﬁrms that aim to discover as much of information as possible on the payoff
structure; to have expectations on the relationship between R&D and proﬁt. Such a learning would
be based on inductive reasoning (Holland, Holyoak & Thagard [1989]). Oltra & Yildizoglu [1998]
propose to model these expectations using an artiﬁcial neural network (ANN). A more complete
learning model should then proceed in cascade: a GA searching the strategy space and an ANN
providing expected ﬁtness values for strategies. Learning would in this case include a better under-
standing of the environment of the ﬁrm (through the adjustment of the ANN) and the discovery of
better strategies (through the workings of the GA) given this understanding.
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12Appendix: parameter values
dinis ﬁxed in order to have a initial innovation probability of 5%: dim = din=10:
Parameter Value
Number of NWFirms: NNW variable
Number of GenFirms: NGen variable
Output frequency 40
Number of simulations 20
Number of periods: T 3000
Using cost of capital: c 0:1
Initial productivity: A0 0:16
Initial capital: K0 50
Demand elasticity: h 0:5
Autonomous demand: D 100
Depreciation rate: d 5%
Threshold capital: K 10−5
R&D rate of NWFirms: rdNW 7%
Minimal R&D rate: rdmin 3%
Dispersion of Innovations: s 0:05
Number of chromosomes: C 8
Number of genes: G 7
Xover points 1
Learning rate: n 5
P[Xover] 0:7
P[Mutate] 0:03